COPS BROKE THE LAW &…TARRANT WON

The Clash between the “Official” Cause of the Christchurch Mosques Massacre, and the Real Cause. The Making of Fudge

The first phase of the Coronial Inquiry into the Christchurch mosques Massacre is scheduled to begin on 24 October 2023, almost three and a half years since the Massacre. It’s a ridiculously long delay and the smart money is on the Coroner reaching a startling conclusion; that the victims died because they…were shot.

Fudge is sickly confectionary. Also, according to the Oxford dictionary, to “Fudge” is to “present or deal with (something) in a vague or inadequate way, especially so as to conceal the truth or mislead”.

Apologies for the length of this Substack. We have a nauseatingly Big Batch of Fudge to digest.

Former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern will have you believe that the cause of the Massacre was the killer viewing anti-Islam material on-line (which no doubt he did). With French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron, Ardern launched her “Christchurch Call”, a project to “eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online”, a bold ambition akin to her ambition to cure Child PoverDy.  The incontrovertible truth however is that bucket loads of red-necks view extreme clap trap on-line and virtually none of them proceed to gun down others.

It’s impossible to shoot people without guns (stop me if I get too technical). So if simian killer Brenton Harrison Tarrant hadn’t obtained his guns, the Massacre could not and would not have occurred.

And, crucially, the New Zealand Police broke the law in issuing Tarrant with the gun licence he needed to obtain his guns. In other words, because Tarrant could not have conducted the Massacre but for the New Zealand Police unlawfully issuing Tarrant with a firearms licence, the New Zealand Government (through its agency, the Police) was responsible for the Massacre. Hence the Fudge-making.

The Fudge-making began with New Zealand’s Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 2019 Terrorist Massacre on Christchurch Mosques.

The Terms of Reference for the Commission of Inquiry required the Inquiry to report its findings on “whether any relevant State sector agency failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault, whether in whole or in part”.

In its Executive Summary, the Commission of Inquiry’s Report states:

• “We conclude that during the firearms licence application process, insufficient attention was given to whether gaming friend and their parent knew the individual well enough to be appropriate referees”

• “We find that New Zealand Police’s administration of the firearms licensing system did not meet required standards”. 

The Commission’s Report sets out in meticulous detail the multi-layered failures of the Police in relation to the Terrorist Massacre, and contains other information that, pieced together, reveals other failures. The singularly unnerving aspect of the Report, however, is that it deliberately shies away from the obvious; that the Police broke the law in issuing Tarrant with his gun licence.

Buried in the Report is an assertion: “Although the logic of the Arms Regulations might suggest that the near relative who must be identified on the application should also be interviewed, this is not a requirement under the regulations [emphasis added].” That assertion - that there is no legal requirement for a near relative to be interviewed as a referee - is indisputably incorrect. That the Report’s author, retired judge William Young, is no slouch as a legal brain makes that assertion disconcerting, to say the least. It’s hellishly difficult to entertain a notion that Young made an honest mistake in his legal analysis.

Police failure #1: No Near Relative Interviewed

Tarrant’s original firearms licence application proposed his sister, Lauren Tarrant, as a near relative referee. However, the Police rejected Lauren as a referee. Having determined not to use Tarrant’s sister as a referee, the Police were then not legally entitled to issue Tarrant with a firearms licence. That should’ve ended Tarrant’s evil project.

For the following reasons, the correct and proper interpretation of the applicable legal Regulations is that a near relative of any firearms licence applicant must be contacted by the Police and give a favourable reference in order for the Police to be legally entitled to issue the applicant with a firearms licence.

When Tarrant applied for a firearms licence in September 2017, the Regulations provided, unequivocally: “Every application for a firearms licence must state…the name and address of a near relative of the applicant”.

The necessary and unavoidable legal conclusion from the fact that the Regulations required a firearms licence to state the name and address of a near relative of the applicant is that, in order to have issued Tarrant with his licence, the Police had to use a near relative as a referee. Because a near relative of Tarrant was not used as a referee, the Police were legally prohibited from issuing Tarrant with a firearms licence.

Tarrant’s original application stated Lauren Tarrant as a “near relative” referee and an on-line gaming friend as his second referee. But the Police did not attempt to contact Lauren. The Police’s reason for not interviewing Lauren was that, because Lauren resided in Australia, they could not interview her face-to-face. The law did not require face-to-face interviews with referees. And, in something as important as the issuing of a firearms licence, the Police could of course have required Lauren to travel to New Zealand for a face-to-face interview (even though face-to-face interviews are not legally required).

It gets worse. Having decided not to use Lauren as a witness, the Police went back to Tarrant and, on his instruction, themselves changed his application form to specify the father of Tarrant’s gaming friend as a referee in place of Lauren. At this point, the application form no longer complied with the Regulations (because it did not specify a “near relative” as a referee) and it was on the basis of that unlawful application form that Tarrant’s application for a firearms licence was approved.

Police Failure #2: Gaming Friend and his Father accepted as Adequate Referees

The Report found:

• “in dealing with the individual’s firearms licence application, New Zealand Police did not adequately address the issue whether gaming friend and their parent knew the individual well enough to serve as referees”

• “On the basis of usual licensing practice, gaming friend’s personal association with the individual was insufficient for them to serve as the substitute for a near-relative referee and inadequate attention was paid to this issue. The association of gaming friend’s parent with the individual was undoubtedly insufficient for them to act as a referee”.

Tarrant’s referees fell woefully short of the Police being able to legitimately regard them as adequate referees. The factors militating against the gaming friend and his father being able to be considered acceptable referees include the following.

As for the gaming friend:

• According to their very own records the Police knew the following about the gaming friend:

  • In December 2015, the gaming friend unlawfully tried to import four firearm parts. The parts were intercepted at the border and seized

  • In May 2014, the gaming friend unlawfully tried to import a knuckleduster knife, an offensive weapon under New Zealand law. The knuckleduster knife was seized

• Tarrant and gaming friend had spent approximately 21 days together while Tarrant was staying with the referees in 2013, travelling around with gaming friend between March and May 2013 and staying with the referees in August 2017. In reality, gaming friend hardly knew Tarrant (although he did know about, but did not disclose to the Police, Tarrant’s anti-Islam views).

As for the gaming friend’s father:

• Over four years, he had spent only seven days in Tarrant’s presence, most of which had been four years prior to Tarrant’s firearms licence application. Gaming friend’s father’s only association with Tarrant was as a consequence of Tarrant’s online friendship with his son.

• In a rare instance of clear-eyed concession, the Report states “We think it clear that the very limited relationship between gaming friend’s parent and the individual was too limited to justify them serving as a referee.”

It is impossible to over-state just how aberrant and non-compliant the Police’s approach was in accepting gaming friend and his father as referees. When the Police rejected Tarrant’s sister as a near relative referee, the Police altered the application form to “make” the gaming friend a substitute near relative referee and, at Tarrant’s instigation, to add gaming friend’s father as a second referee. Quite apart from gaming friend obviously not being a near relative of Tarrant, the Regulations expressly required the non-near relative referee to be “a person…of whom inquiries can be made about whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be in possession of a firearm”. There is manifestly no basis on which the Police could legitimately have regarded gaming friend’s father as a person of whom inquiries could be made about whether Tarrant was a fit and proper person to be in possession of a firearm. As the Police were well aware, gaming friend’s father barely knew Tarrant.

Police failure #3 Father & Son Referees

The Report acknowledges the poor judgement of the Police in accepting, as referees, a father and son. The Report states “With the benefit of hindsight, we see the parent and child relationship as material to what happened” and “We doubt whether gaming friend’s parent would have been prepared to act as a referee based on seven days’ engagement with an applicant who was not a friend of their child”. What the Report finds, in effect, is that gaming friend’s father was not really a separate referee at all. It’s another example of the fact that the Police personnel involved displayed no innate sense for what was appropriate in dealing with a firearms licence application.

Police failure #4 Going through the Motions

In order to issue a firearms licence the Police were expressly required to satisfy themselves that an applicant was “a fit and proper person to be in possession of a firearm” and were prohibited from issuing a licence if the application was not such a fit and proper person.

However, it is readily apparent from the Report that, rather than actively seeking to satisfy themselves that Tarrant was a fit and proper person to possess a firearm, the Police’s approach was to treat Tarrant’s application as a fait accompli. The Police’s notes of the interviews with Tarrant and the referees are revealing: “[Tarrant] appears to be a sound person who shows good attitudes and safety sense with firearms”/”a sensible responsible person”/“good outstanding young man a nice person”.

In fact, even from the Police’s limited investigations it should have been readily apparent to Police personnel that, far from being a “good outstanding young man”, Tarrant was clearly a solitary drifter with no obvious reason to be in New Zealand.

By ignoring the legal requirements relating to referees and otherwise adopting a superficial and formulaic approach to Tarrant’s application, the Police sealed the fate of the victims of the Massacre.

There are a couple of overarching aspects of the Police’s failures in issuing Tarrant with a firearms licence that warrant specific emphasis.

First, it is apparent from the Report that none of the Police personnel involved in the process by which Tarrant was issued with a firearms licence comprehended the vital importance of referees having to know a firearms applicant well and the crucial need for the Police to ask themselves whether proposed referees in fact know the applicant well enough to be acceptable as referees.

In any vetting process involving referees (let alone something as important as assessing a person for a firearms licence), there is probably nothing more important than assessing the adequacy of proposed referees. And yet, this imperative appears to have entirely escaped all the relevant Police personnel. The Report gives a distinct impression that the Police’s attitude to referees was that, in relation to any application for a firearms licence, there will necessarily be two individuals who can act as referees; hence the farcical insertion by the Police of gaming friend’s father as a referee.

We can only feel terribly sorry for the Police personnel who granted Tarrant his gun licence. The Report criticizes the Police for a lack of training and guidance of personnel involved in assessing firearms licence applications. But do persons involved in any process involving assessment of the adequacy of referees really need to be trained to understand that individuals can only “count” as referees if they know the applicant well enough? A person who does not innately understand that vital element cannot and should not play any role in assessing firearms licence applications.

Secondly, in issuing Tarrant with a firearms licence the Police viewed positively the fact that the referees – gaming friend and his father – each held a firearms licence. In particular “That they held licenses and endorsements was seen as outweighing the incidents recorded on the National Intelligence Application” (in addition to gaming friend’s intercepted efforts at unlawful importations and gaming friend’s father’s four criminal convictions). In reality, it is reasonably apparent from the Report that in practice the relevant Police personnel regarded firearms licence holders as a club which, through existing firearms licence holders acting as referees, can welcome new members without the Police having to make their own independent qualitative assessments of referees or applicants.

WHAT IF THE POLICE HAD DONE THEIR JOB AND NOT ISSUED TARRANT WITH A FIREARMS LICENCE?

The Report gives only scant and oblique attention to what may have happened if Tarrant had not received a firearms licence. As alluded to, there’s a strong whiff of the reason for this; that Police incompetence enabled the Massacre to occur.

The Report contains the following speculation on what would have happened if the Police had done their job:

“We have considered what might have happened had the licensing policy and process been appropriate and how this may have impacted the events of 15 March 2019. This involves counter-factual analysis (an assessment of what would have happened if events had taken a different course) that is hypothetical and speculative.

“With the cautions just mentioned in mind, we consider that:

• if someone had spoken to Lauren Tarrant and she supported the application, a decision to grant the licence would have been difficult to fault;

• if it had been concluded that gaming friend or their parent did not know the individual well enough to serve as referees, the application would not have been granted at that time; and

• if the individual’s application had not been granted, it is uncertain how he would have responded. We think it is possible, and perhaps likely, that he would have been able to obtain a licence eventually, perhaps by arranging for Lauren Tarrant to come to New Zealand for an interview. This may have delayed his preparation for the terrorist Massacre. It is also possible that he may have formulated a plan to carry out the terrorist Massacre using different means or abandoned his planning for a terrorist Massacre in New Zealand.”

The above speculation on what may have happened (“what might have happened had the licensing policy and process been appropriate and how this may have impacted the events of 15 March 2019” i.e. what might have happened if the Police had done their job and Tarrant had not received a firearms licence) is cursory and curious.

The Report states that “It is also possible that he may have…abandoned his planning for a terrorist Massacre in New Zealand” i.e. he may have chosen to give up trying to execute a terrorist Massacre in New Zealand. But the logic goes beyond Tarrant abandoning planning for a terrorist Massacre in New Zealand. Without a firearms licence, he would not have obtained firearms and could not have launched his firearms-based Massacre. Even if, without a firearms licence, Tarrant wouldn’t have abandoned his planning, he simply couldn’t have obtained firearms for the Massacre.

Of course, Tarrant could have planned and executed a different type of Massacre (“he may have formulated a plan to carry out the terrorist Massacre using different means”). Or he may have tried to obtain firearms on a black market. The Report does not canvass the possibility that, if Tarrant had not received a firearms licence, he may have explored the black market, or the likelihood of him being able to obtain firearms on the black market. It is at least curious that the Report does not adequately address what may have happened if Tarrant had not received a firearms licence. And that appears to be deliberate. Because any comprehensive analysis of what may have happened if the Police had performed properly and not issued Tarrant a firearms licence would necessarily spotlight the truth that, if the Police had done their job properly, the Massacre could and would not have happened - such that the Police’s incompetence caused the Massacre.

Tarrant was from Australia, had only been living in New Zealand for 15 days before initiating the process to obtain a firearms licence and was poorly connected in New Zealand, such that his ability to obtain firearms in the New Zealand black market would have been significantly worse than others without firearms licenses. For all practical purposes it is fair to say that, without a firearms licence, Tarrant could not have obtained the firearms he used for the Massacre.

There has been a distinct and unfortunate political sleight of hand at play in addressing the Commission’s Report, which fudges the Police’s (i.e. the New Zealand Government’s) responsibility for the Massacre. Multiple political pronouncements have suggested that no failures by state agencies resulted in the Massacre; in other words that the Massacre would still have occurred even if all state agencies had properly performed their roles. But the Report says no such thing. The Report did find that New Zealand’s security agencies could not have detected Tarrant. But the Report certainly did not find that the Police’s failures did not lead to the Massacre.

And, unfortunately, the media has been seduced by this sleight of hand. For example:

• The New Zealand Herald reported “Despite these findings, the report says nothing could have been done to stop the March 15, 2019 Massacres, which left 51 Muslims dead, and the agencies were not to blame”.

• And from the Guardian: “New Zealand's prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, has apologised for the failings in the lead-up to the 2019 Christchurch terrorist Massacres, but noted: 'The commission made no findings that these issues would have stopped the Massacre'.”

The surviving victims of the Massacre and all others directly and adversely affected are being horribly let down by New Zealand’s authorities. They should be compensated. Your plodding McSubstack was the first to point out to the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand that our Police are squarely to blame for the Massacre. Where’s Kindness now?